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David Crippen
A fundamental tenet of legal justice is that it is better to 
let ten guilty men go free than convict one innocent man. 
Th e reciprocal in medicine is that it is better to artiﬁ cially 
maintain life in ten death spirals than miss one expected 
survivor. Physicians are famous for ignoring impediments 
to the care of their individual patients. No long-shot 
treatment is shelved and no expense is spared no matter 
how dim the potential outcome. A righteous contempt is 
shown toward administrative pleas to consider cost.
In the past, this strategy worked only as well as the 
ability of the resource allocation system providing for it: 
an open-ended credit card with an unclear path to replete 
funds. Now we are seeing strong evidence of a new health 
care allocation system that will create a closed system 
whereby excising some portions of the pie directly aﬀ ects 
the size of the other portions. Th e bigger some portions 
get, the fewer are available.
Th e amount of money spent on end-of-life care, 
speciﬁ cally dying at the end of life, dwarfs other expen-
ditures. And the unique situation of critical care will 
create a double dip for each patient maintained on 
artiﬁ cial life support. If we are willing to maintain 100 
moribund patients in ICUs for a prolonged period to 
yield one long-shot survivor, we do not pay for just the 
survivor. We pay also to warehouse the other 99 failures 
not quite dead or alive but with stable vital signs.
Since it is diﬃ  cult to know on admission which patients 
will beneﬁ t from life-supporting organ failure reversal, 
we admit all comers for a trial. Now comes a logical 
extension of that policy. At any time in the course of 
treatment, it is equally diﬃ  cult to predict outcome, so we 
should maintain most if not all moribund patients 
indeﬁ nitely to avoid killing the occasional unexpectedly 
survivor.
In the case presented here, we have a long-term ICU 
patient with a small but potentially survivable prognosis 
on a seemingly endless course of life support. Ten years 
ago, most physicians would have buckled down and 
maintained such a patient simply until he died of 
something else. As in a poker game, the winning card was 
still in the deck but could appear at any time.
Physicians are looking at anecdotal evidence that we 
should wait longer before declaring unsalvageability, but 
we are facing health care reform that will expect 
physicians to care for more patients more cheaply. Th at 
pie can be cut only so many ways. Every day a long-term 
patient lies in an ICU is a day that resources for other 
patients diminish commensurately. How long is long 
The case
The patient is a 27-year-old previously healthy 
male with a diagnosis of viral encephalitis with a 
lymphocytic pleocytosis on cerebrospinal fl uid 
examination. For 3 months, he has been in status 
epilepticus (SE) on high doses of barbiturates, 
benzodiazepines, and ketamine and a ketogenic 
feeding-tube formula. He remains in burst suppression 
on continuous electroencephalography (EEG). He 
is trached and has a percutaneous endoscopic 
gastrostomy (PEG) feeding tube. He has been treated 
several times for pneumonia, and he is on a warming 
blanket and is on vasopressors to maintain his blood 
pressure. His vitals are stable and his lab work is within 
limits. The sedation is decreased under EEG guidance 
every 72 hours, after which he goes back into SE 
and heavy sedation is resumed. The latest magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) shows edema but otherwise 
no obvious permanent cortical damage. The family 
wants a realistic assessment of the likely outcome. 
The neurologist tells them the literature suggests the 
outlook is poor but not 100% fatal. As long as all of his 
other organs are functioning on life support, there is 
always a chance the seizures will stop at some time 
in the future, and so the neurologist recommends an 
open-ended intensive care unit (ICU) plan and hopes 
for that outcome.
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enough? How long is too long? How many moribund 
patients are we willing to warehouse to ﬁ nd one outlier? 
Th e question then becomes how will our intrepid concern 
for our individual patients be aﬀ ected by real-time 
competition for others desiring their pieces of the pie?
Dick Burrows
Can we aﬀ ord open-ended ICU care? No, the resources 
are inadequate. 
Th ere can be no argument that improved technology 
has revolutionized medical treatment. Th ere is improved 
survival in many conditions that previously would have 
been fatal. 
Th e downside is an assumption that a technical (ICU) 
solution can solve an adaptive sociocultural problem [1]; 
death and dying are not the result of a failure of 
technology. So far, death remains undefeated [2], result-
ing in questionable costs that are greatest in the last few 
weeks of life. Death occurs in 100% of people, but dying is 
a process, and the exact time of death is seldom deﬁ nable, 
making individual decisions to stop resuscitation 
extremely diﬃ  cult, especially in cases in which technology 
has delayed death, and there are always those who ‘beat 
the odds’. Th e failure of medical school curricula to 
address the topic of death and dying [2] means that 
clinicians are ill equipped to deal with the subject. Th e 
pressure to apply the technology, irrespectively of costs, 
is considerable.
Medicine has changed to accommodate the cost of the 
technology. Th e days in which the patient approached the 
doctor and paid for the service (when the patient could) 
are long gone. A third party, either the state or insurance 
of some sort, has taken responsibility for payment, but 
the relationship is complex, and ultimately the individual 
or (more likely) the family remains responsible for 
medical care. Th is is reﬂ ected in the fact that 62% of 
bankruptcies in the US are for medical reasons [3]. 
As a result, the right of the physician to treat as he or 
she sees ﬁ t has been curtailed by the third party on the 
basis of the economic costs of treatment. It is diﬃ  cult to 
ascertain the number of (adult) intensive care beds that 
should be provided for the population. One paper 
indicates six beds per 100,000 persons [4]. In 2004, in 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, there was less than one 
ICU bed per 100,000 persons and this has not increased 
substantially. Th is meant that, in 2004, ICU clinicians at 
two hospitals in Durban denied entry to as many as half 
of the critically ill patients. Th e most common reason to 
refuse admission was that the unit was full. Another 
reason was that, in the view of the ICU staﬀ , the 
admission would achieve no beneﬁ t to the patient. 
Consequently, the patient in the case above would not 
have been admitted. A mechanism did exist in some 
hospitals to refer patients as an interim measure to a 
private unit but this was often curtailed for budget 
reasons. If a patient was insured, he or she would be 
admitted to a private hospital but a call to transfer him or 
her to the state sector would be inevitable when the 
insurance coverage was exhausted. At that time, the 
prognosis would be reviewed and a decision to admit or 
not to admit would be made. 
Th e distinction between patient autonomy and 
economic issues is unclear as the clinician has a duty not 
to waste resources [5] and is forced to make decisions 
short of a point of certainty [6]. Th e availability of 
resources simply shifts that point away from certainty, 
and it serves no purpose to walk away from the problem, 
insisting that someone else deal with it.
In this part of the world (Ireland), the patient in the 
case above would be admitted, but the economic realities 
of the moment indicate that this will likely change 
precipitously over the coming months as there is a 
progressive failure to service demands. At some point, 
treatment will have to stop, the state will ration care, and 
the insurance company will limit coverage or initiate 
proceedings against the estate if treatment continues in 
the absence of continuing funds. Negotiation and 
conciliation will be the order of the day. It will be diﬃ  cult. 
Nino Stocchetti
I think that the care plan in this case should be changed 
after 3 months or perhaps before. Th ree aspects should 
be considered:
1. Th e beneﬁ t for the patient. It looks very doubtful after 
such long treatment, and iatrogenic damage due to 
high-dose barbiturates and so on is obvious. My 
experience with high-dose barbiturates (7 to 8 g of 
pentothal per day in a 70-kg man) is that severe 
cardiac, hemodynamic, and infectious compli ca tions 
are the rule after the ﬁ rst days. I never used them for 
more than 7 to 10 days.
2. Th e beneﬁ t for the family. Family stress can reach 
unbearable levels in months of never-ending tension.
3. Th e beneﬁ t for society. My unit has 6 beds, 4 during 
summertime. Th is shortage and the costs related to 
every ICU bed make the responsible use of resources 
essential [7]. Keeping a highly specialized bed occupied 
for months denies this resource to others.
What makes this case especially diﬃ  cult is the lack of 
strong evidence concerning the expected outcome. In 
traumatic brain injury, we base our prognosis on several 
thousands of cases [8], whereas for encephalitis, there is 
no database of comparable size. In fact, there is no large 
database at all. Anecdotal cases and even small series are 
of limited use, and diﬀ erent opinions and doubts are 
respectable.
However, an SE refractory to maximal treatment for 
3  months indicates extremely severe brain damage and 
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does conﬁ rm that we do not have an eﬀ ective treatment. 
Having conﬁ rmed the ineﬃ  cacy of maximum treatment 
for 3 months, I would conclude that it is rather futile. 
Th en the diﬃ  cult choice is to justify a protracted unuseful 
treatment rather than its withdrawal.
Due to the admitted limited knowledge, I would ask 
colleagues from outside the department, with an 
international reputation, for a collegial expert opinion. If 
they conﬁ rmed my assessment, I would proceed; other-
wise, I would wait further. Th en I would oﬀ er the family 
the option of external consultation in order to dispel the 
notion that the reason the therapy plan is being pursued 
is that the treating doctors are bored or mistaken. Th e 
family has the right to call other experts.
Having collected the (presumed homogeneous) opinions 
of various colleagues (including, eventually, someone 
nominated by the family) about the futility of further 
insistence, I would talk again with the family, hoping to 
obtain their consensus. My proposal would be to stop 
barbiturates and ketamine, aiming at spontaneous 
breathing, not restarting high-dose sedation even if SE 
re-appeared. I would give the family the option of 
transferring the patient to another institution, if required.
Stephan A Mayer
I would absolutely continue to oﬀ er long-term aggressive 
care and support to this patient. Tremendous and un-
expected recoveries can happen only if you let them.
If there is one condition that can defy expectations and 
from which patients can emerge after months and 
months in coma, it is SE in a young patient with normal 
brain imaging and a clinical diagnosis of encephalitis. Th e 
literature, in fact, is replete with reports of similar 
patients recovering from coma after several months on 
pentobarbital.
One of our more memorable patients at Columbia 
[University, College of Physicians and Surgeons] was a 
Taiwanese woman in her early 20s with highly refractory 
SE whom we diagnosed with an ovarian teratoma and 
anti-NMDA-receptor antibodies and autoimmune 
encephalitis. It took several months to terminate the 
seizures, which came back relentlessly every time the 
pentobarbital was lifted, just like in the patient described 
above. Th ereafter, she was in a seizure-free vegetative 
state for over 6 months. Finally, New York Presbyterian 
Hospital paid over $100,000 for an air ambulance to ﬂ y 
her back to a hospital in Taiwan. It was that or provide a 
lifetime of care to an un documented alien in a persistent 
vegetative state.
Imagine our shock when, 6 months later, the accepting 
neurologist sent us a photograph of her, smiling and 
apparently intact. It took a year for her to start to follow 
commands, then she entered rehabilitation, and now she 
has a second chance on life, with minimal disability. We 
never in our wildest dreams expected her to recover after 
we sent her back to Taiwan. And she would never have 
had that chance if we had pushed the family to pull the 
plug when she was in our ICU.
Of course, patients have the right to be treated the way 
they want to and that includes the right to refuse 
unwanted life support. We all believe that, as physicians, 
we should not play God – it is not our role to make these 
decisions, and the patient has the ﬁ nal say. But the ideal 
of free will in medical decision-making is just that: an 
ideal. In real life, the decisions that family members make 
are a direct consequence of what they hear from us.
In the scenario above, I would provide a realistic 
estimate of the likely spectrum of outcomes in 1 year 
with continued full-court aggressive support. I would 
estimate that four possible outcomes have an equal 
likelihood of occurring: (a) dead of a fatal medical 
complication, (b) vegetative, (c) conscious and severely 
disabled, or (d) walking and talking and working on a 
good recovery. I would remind the family that as long as 
the goal is survival to discharge, our team would 
collectively focus on complete recovery as the goal of our 
eﬀ orts. Given that information, I then would provide 
three potential goals of action: (a) full medical support 
until discharge, (b) full medical support with a do-not-
resuscitate (DNR) order, and (c) DNR and terminal 
extubation. Th ese are the ‘three paths’, and they can pick 
only one path. I do not allow families (or ourselves) to 
pursue prolonged life support combined with ambivalent 
and half-hearted medical or neurological intervention.
Finally, I always give the family the option of changing 
the plan, cutting their losses, and opting for comfort at 
any point down the road if they feel that their loved one 
has been through enough. I call it our ‘money back 
guarantee’.
Peter Andrews
Th is illustrative case has some unusual features that 
require further clariﬁ cation. But the question ‘what 
management plan is in the best interests of this previously 
healthy young man, who is now requiring multiple-organ 
support for intractable SE and requiring barbiturate 
coma because of recurrent seizures?’ is important. I 
believe that the prognosis after 3 months on intractable 
SE as a complication of presumed viral encephalitis is 
poor in the extreme.
Before we can conclude that withdrawal of organ 
support is appropriate, a number of actions are required:
1. A multi-disciplinary team (MDT) discussion about 
this very diﬃ  cult case should occur between neuro-
logy, critical care, neurophysiology, and infectious 
diseases. Possibly, a consult from a national expert on 
the encephalitis in question would also help establish the 
likely prognosis with more certainty. Neuro physio logy 
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should be involved, monitoring the seizures on a daily 
basis.
2. Th e serum levels of anticonvulsants (those in addition 
to barbiturates) should be measured to establish that 
they are in their ‘therapeutic range’. Commonly, 
phenytoin, sodium valproate, and levetiracetam [9] are 
used in these circumstances. Once these agents are 
optimized and after at least 24 hours of burst suppres-
sion induced by barbiturates, the anesthetic agent 
should be reduced. Recurrence of seizures (assessed by 
EEG and clinical exam and ideally with video EEG for 
both) mandates action to suppress this activity. Th is is 
the sequence of events described in this case.
3. After such a long period of seizures, it is likely that 
severe cerebral injury has occurred. However, I would 
consider the use of hypothermia to see whether this 
intervention could improve the situation [10]. Th ere 
are reports of success in SE with this intervention.
After 3 months of intractable SE still requiring 
barbiturate-induced burst suppression, the outlook is 
very poor. Further MRI sequences may be helpful to 
document the extent of neurological damage (that is, 
diﬀ usion-weighted imaging, diﬀ usion tensor imaging, 
and so on). Th e neurologist has stated to the family that 
the outlook is poor but not 100% fatal. Th e literature that 
this prognosis is based upon is likely to come from papers 
relating to the particular viral encephalitis. I would 
suggest, however, that when the situation is complicated 
by such a long period of SE, the outlook is considerably 
worse.
If the patient were comatose but not in SE and not 
requiring advanced organ support, I would recommend 
discharge to an acute neurology ward with a tracheo s tomy 
and PEG or RIG (radiologically inserted gastros tomy) 
feeding. Th e situation could then be monitored over a 
number of weeks or months. However, in this case, the 
MDT should agree on this prognosis and then meet with 
the family to discuss changing the emphasis of care to 
palliation and comfort care.
Tom Bleck
Th e data available from studies of SE in the literature 
really provide no guidance in dealing with a case such as 
this. Th ere are published cases of recovery after long 
durations of SE refractory to treatments other than 
suppression by barbiturates (weeks to months), but there 
are no population-based or even hospital-based analyses 
with denominators to provide an estimate of the 
likelihood of functional recovery. My practice in this 
circumstance is to pay attention to the MRI results; if the 
MRI does not show evidence of progressive tissue 
destruc tion, then I continue to support the patients 
aggres sively. I am aware of several patients who were in 
SE suppressed with high-dose barbiturates for over 
3 months and who eventually awakened and returned to 
reasonably normal function. In my experience, about 1 
patient out of 5 in this patient’s circumstances returns to 
work or school after prolonged treatment for refractory 
SE and almost all of the remainder die in the ICU. So I 
agree with the neurologist in this case.
In the absence of demonstrated brain destruction, 
withdrawing aggressive therapy for SE because the staﬀ  
or family is exhausted by the strain of prolonged 
treatment would likely result in another example of self-
fulﬁ lling prophecy. Th is phenomenon is being recognized 
with increasing frequency in neurocritical care. As a 
resident, I was trained to appear wise by hanging crepe 
and counseling an early transition to comfort care. As I 
get older, I sometimes ponder how many potentially 
functional survivors I consigned to an early grave. Th is is 
an area that cries out for a multi-center outcome analysis 
based on quality of life-years.
How was this patient’s diagnosis of ‘viral’ encephalitis 
established? In the absence of virologic or serologic 
conﬁ rmation, one should consider an autoimmune 
etiology and perhaps treat with immunosuppressive 
agents or plasma exchange after an appropriate workup. 
Th ere are other treatment modalities, including electro-
convulsive therapy, cooling, or vagal nerve or deep brain 
stimulation, to be considered. If the seizures arise from a 
consistent focus, resective surgery or multiple subpial 
transection could also be considered.
Leslie Whetstine
Conclusions
Th is case highlights, among other things, the remarkable 
diﬀ erences in health care resource allocation throughout 
the world. Both Bleck and Mayer, neurologists practicing 
in the US, are reluctant to withdraw an enormous expen-
diture of time and resources if there is a marginal chance 
for survival [11]. Both conclude that there are insuﬃ  cient 
data to accurately prognosticate long-term outcome and 
so continuing open-ended aggressive treatment is 
appropriate. Th eir approach contrasts markedly with that 
of Burrows and Stocchetti, intensivists practicing in 
Europe. Both Burrows and Stocchetti must consider the 
investment of time and resources because expending 
resources on one patient impacts the care of others. 
While the Americans do not discuss the issue of cost as a 
determinant factor in their analyses, the Europeans 
clearly regard it as a key component to the issue.
Andrews does not address cost but instead recom-
mends an MDT approach to assess the patient as well as 
additional tests and therapies to ensure that all 
possibilities for improvement have been exhausted. He 
concludes that if such an alternative care plan showed no 
further change, intractable SE described in the clinical 
scenario would indicate moving to a palliative care plan. 
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Crippen, an American with a utilitarian mindset, unveils 
the iniquities inherent in a private practice system by 
asking diﬃ  cult questions that run contrary to American 
sensibilities. Although he does not go so far as to invoke 
the concept of rationing as prioritization, it is the logical 
conclusion to his argument.
Th is case illustrates the need for resource allocation 
policies at the macro level. Before this can be done, 
however, established guidelines that are grounded in 
evidence-based medicine are necessary. Otherwise, the 
inﬂ ammatory rhetoric commonly heard in the current 
health care reform debate in the US (that government or 
some other regulatory body will be ‘killing grandma’) will 
paralyze discussion. Moreover, it is worth noting that 
Burrows and Stocchetti are not individual physicians 
ﬂ outing the rules; they are acting within constraints that 
their countries have implemented. Mayer and Bleck 
cannot be expected to ameliorate the shortcomings of an 
unfair and moribund system on their own.
Ethically, this case emphasizes the need for taking 
resource allocation policies to a level away from indivi-
duals making isolated anecdotal decisions at the bedside. 
Taking the debate to a level of authoritative data erases 
the potential for capricious decision making. Once those 
data are transparently obtained, a rational discus sion as 
to what level is appropriate to stop treatment can proceed.
Th e public needs assurance that they are not deprived 
of treatment based on an arbitrary or mercenary 
economic model. Within the past 6 months, an 
authoritative ﬁ gure, Sanjay Gupta, published a book [12] 
that chronicled recovery from near death; a patient 
diagnosed in persistent vegetative state is now allegedly 
using assistive communication devices, and a poorly 
managed recommendation regard ing mammogram 
protocols reinforced societal disdain for bureaucratic 
regulation. Th ese cases as well as the one presented here 
should be viewed through the lens of objective data 
rather than the bias of individual physicians [13]. When 
this occurs, the care of these patients will be standardized 
for the most beneﬁ t, the most reasonable cost, and the 
most equity for all.
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